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I. INTRODUCTION
NLESS the Texas Supreme Court acts soon, the corporation, as a
distinct legal entity, separate from its shareholders, officers, and
affiliates, is in serious danger in Texas. During this Survey pe-
riod,1 the Texas courts2 evidenced an increasingly alarming trend of disre-
garding the corporation in situations for which no predictable basis can
be ascertained. These cases leave corporate practitioners unable to ad-
vise their clients as to the proper means of ensuring the continued effi-
* Glenn D. West is a partner in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas.
** Benton B. Bodamer is a student associate in the Corporate Department of Weil,
Gotshal & Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas.
1. Although the official Survey period for this Article is December 1, 2004 through
November 30, 2005, relevant cases past this point were included as permitted up to the
time this Article was submitted for publication.
2. As in previous years, relevant courts, for purposes of this Survey, are limited to
Texas state courts, federal district courts in Texas, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit interpreting issues of Texas law. Since this Survey's scope is limited to
Texas corporate-law issues, neither purely federal corporate issues nor federal or state se-
curities issues are discussed.
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cacy of the corporate shield. Moreover, these cases appear to undo the
legislative efforts that were undertaken in 1989, 1993, and 1997, through
the various amendments of Article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act ("TBCA"), 3 to further protect the corporate form. Article 2.21
was originally amended to counteract the business uncertainty created
following the now infamous "alter-ego" decision by the Texas Supreme
Court in Castleberry v. Branscum.4 Additional amendments were made
to Article 2.21 in an attempt "to 'curb the creativity of the bench and
bar' 5 in ignoring the plain import of the statute that unequivocally makes
shareholders, shareholder's affiliates, and affiliates of the corporation un-
available as sources of repayment for contractual obligations of the cor-
poration or torts arising from those contractual obligations."' 6 That
"creativity" has, in fact, remained unabated. As a result, an increasingly
bewildering array of "veil-piercing" theories with indeterminate elements
have developed. The worst of these is the "single business enterprise"
theory. In Part II, we discuss this disturbing theory and its increasing use
during this Survey period.
Despite the Texas courts' increasing willingness to ignore the corporate
form based on uncertain criteria in "veil-piercing" cases, the Texas courts
are paradoxically (but properly) strict in requiring the corporation to ob-
serve statutory requirements applicable to their continued existence. In
Part III, we discuss how the lapse of the corporate form under statute, if
not timely revived, may permanently extinguish certain rights of the
entity.
3. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 2003). Article 2.21 provides, in rele-
vant part, that:
[a] holder of shares,... or any affiliate thereof or of the corporation shall be
under no obligation to the corporation or to its obligees with respect to...
any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating to or
arising from the obligation on the basis that the holder .... or affiliate is or
was the alter-ego of the corporation, or on the basis of actual fraud or con-
structive fraud, a sham to perpetuate a fraud, or similar theory, unless the
obligee demonstrates that the holder.... or affiliate caused the corporation
to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud
on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of the holder ... or
affiliate.
It should be noted that for corporations formed on or after January 1, 2006, for corpora-
tions formed before January 1, 2006 that self-elect, and for all corporations as of January 1,
2010, the Texas Business Organizations Code ("TBOC") replaces Article 2.21 as control-
ling law. This change in no way affects the law substantively, however, as the requirements
of the TBOC are identical to those of Article 2.21. See TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§§ 21.223-.225 (Vernon 2005).
4. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986). See Glenn D. West & Susan Y. Chao, Corporations, 56
SMU L. REV. 1395, 1397 n.10 (2003).
5. Alan W. Tompkins & Ted S. O'Neal, Corporations and Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 51 SMU L. REV. 817, 825 (1998).
6. West & Chao, supra note 4, at 1397. Following the second round of amendments
to Article 2.21 in 1993, the Fifth Circuit noted the continued resistance of the Texas Su-
preme Court to follow the requirements of Article 2.21. See W. Horizontal Drilling, Inc. v.
Jonnet Energy Corp., 11 F.3d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802
S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex. 1990) and stating that "[w]e recognize that the Texas Supreme Court
seems to be ignoring the amendments to Article 2.21 and continues to permit a failure to
observe corporate formalities as a means of proving alter-ego").
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In previous Surveys, we have sought to give practical advice to corpo-
rate attorneys concerning the clear and informed drafting of agreements.7
This year is no exception. In Part IV, we discuss the fact that, contrary to
popular belief, it is indeed possible, in the right circumstance and with the
right words, to contractually waive fraud and misrepresentation claims
based upon extra-contractual representations.
II. THE JUDICIALLY DISCRETIONARY CORPORATION-
DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE FORM BASED
UPON THE "SINGLE BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE" THEORY
Texas courts have long purported to protect the corporate form and its
sanctity; courts repeatedly stress the importance of the corporation as an
entity separate and distinct from its officers, directors, shareholders and
subsidiaries.8 Nevertheless, the Texas courts also have long recognized
the judicial power to disregard the separate existence of the corporate
entity (or to "pierce the corporate veil") in certain circumstances based
on the wrongful conduct of the corporation's shareholders. 9 Attempts to
impose liability on parent corporations, shareholders, or affiliates have
been and continue to be successful based on the alter-ego, single business
enterprise, and joint business enterprise theories of corporate veil-pierc-
ing. 10 The similarities, differences, and muddled relationship between the
alter-ego and single business enterprise theories, in particular, have been
the subject of previous criticism. 1 The very existence of the single busi-
7. See, e.g., Glenn D. West & Sarah E. Stasny, Corporations, 58 SMU L. REV. 719,
720-30 (2005) (discussing contractual avoidance of extra-contractual claims, contractual ex-
oneration of officers from personal exposure for tort liabilities arising out of corporate
contractual obligations, and maintenance of a letter of intent as a letter of intent); Glenn
D. West & Adam Nelson, Corporations, 57 SMU L. REV. 799, 812-18 (2004).
8. See Glenn D. West, Corporations, 54 SMU L. REV. 1221, 1221-22 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Cementos de Chihuahua, S.A. de C.V. v. Intermodal Sales Corp., 162
S.W.3d 581, 585-86 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet. h.) ("Generally, a court will not
disregard the corporate fiction.., except where it appears the corporate entity ... is being
used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud, to avoid liability, to avoid the effect of a statute, or in
other exceptional circumstances."). See also West & Chao, supra note 4, at 1406 n.88.
10. See Glenn D. West & Brandy L. Treadway, Corporations, 55 SMU L. REV. 803,
806-11 (2002) (noting that several cases discussed the fact that "Texas courts are increas-
ingly utilizing the single business enterprise theory to disregard the corporate form").
Proliferation of the theory does not, however, imply consistency. Different courts apply
the nebulous standards of the single business enterprise theory piecemeal, and some courts
even merge the single business enterprise and alter-ego theories. Id. at 806-09. Compare
Nichols v. Pabtex, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 772 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (equating single business
enterprise and alter-ego theories), with N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Emmons, 50 S.W.3d 103,
119 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied) (distinguishing the two theories).
11. See 20 ROBERT W. HAMILTON, ET AL., TEXAS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS § 26.22, at 442 (2d ed. 2004) ("The 'single business enterprise' doctrine in Texas law
is essentially an end-run around limitations developed in connection with piercing the cor-
porate veil."). The designed limitations discussed by Hamilton would certainly include the
limitations of Article 2.21, which was developed in specific response to the uncertainty
created by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
See also West & Treadway, supra note 10, at 805-11.
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ness enterprise theory, under Texas law, is questionable.' 2 Despite its du-
bious foundation, 13 courts of appeals in Texas have employed the single
business enterprise theory to pierce the corporate veil and continue to do
so.1
4
A. THE INAPPROPRIATE USE OF "SINGLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE"
IN TORT CASES IN WHICH No WRONGFUL
AcTr WAS COMMITTED
In purely tort-based veil-piercing cases, 15 Texas courts continue to
properly employ common-law theories of veil piercing to avoid the cor-
porate shield despite Article 2.21.16 The use of the "single business enter-
prise" theory as one such common-law basis for liability, however, is a
relatively new and disturbing development in Texas law.1 7 According to
one court's characterization, "under the single business enterprise theory,
one corporation may be held liable for the debts of another corporation
where (i) the two corporations share a common business purpose and (ii)
the corporations have integrated their resources to achieve that common
business purpose." 18 Unlike its relative, the alter-ego theory of veil pierc-
ing, which requires some wrongful conduct by the shareholder,' 9 the sin-
gle business enterprise theory treats the sanctity of the corporate form as
a mere balancing test between non-exhaustive, non-exclusive factors. 20
12. See S. Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d 74, 87 (Tex. 2003).
13. Commentators have previously noted that the origins and continued justifications
for the single business enterprise theory are anachronistic. See Robert F. Gray, Jr. et al.,
Corporations, 46 SMU L. REV. 1171, 1175-76 (1993) (noting that "[t]he theory has outlived
any usefulness that it once might have had" and calling Texas courts' continued disregard
for the corporate form "extremely dangerous").
14. See, e.g., SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 169 S.W.3d 27, 43 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. filed) ("Texas recognizes the 'single business enterprise
doctrine' to prevent an entity from relying upon corporate form to evade an existing debt
or legal obligation."); Hoffmann v. Dandurand, 180 S.W.3d 340, 348 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2005, no pet. h.) ("Several Texas appellate courts have.., recognized the single business
enterprise theory as a method of piercing the corporate veil."). See also Paramount Petro-
leum Corp. v. Taylor Rental Ctr., 712 S.W.2d 534, 536-37 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1986, writ ref d n.r.e.) (enunciating an oft-cited list of non-exhaustive factors for finding a
single business enterprise).
15. This occurs, for instance, when TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 2003)
does not apply. Article 2.21 applies only to claims based on contractual obligations and
any claims related to or arising from contractual obligations.
16. As we have previously argued, however, tort claims that relate to or arise from the
negotiation of contractual obligations, such as fraud or negligent misrepresentation related
to a contact's subject matter, should be covered by Article 2.21. West, supra note 8, at
1226-30; West & Treadway, supra note 10, at 814-16; West & Nelson, supra note 7, at 804-
09; West & Chao, supra note 4, at 1403-08; West & Stasny, supra note 7, at 726-27.
17. See, e.g., Paramount Petroleum Corp., 712 S.W.2d at 536-37.
18. DDH Aviation, L.L.C. v. Holly, No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2598-P, 2005 WL 770595, at *6
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2005).
19. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc v. Emmons, 50 S.W.3d 103, 120 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2001, pet. denied) ("[T]he single business enterprise theory differs from the alter-ego the-
ory in that no showing of fraud is required ....").
20. The inconsistent and confusing elements of the test for a single business enterprise
are a primary basis for criticism. See Marilyn Montano, Note, The Single Business Enter-
prise Theory in Texas: A Singularly Bad Idea?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1163, 1193 (2003) (ob-
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PHC-Minden, LP v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.2 ' exemplifies how the sin-
gle business enterprise theory may lead to liability for a parent corpora-
tion or stockholder that has engaged in no fraudulent or wrongful course
of conduct. In PHC-Minden, the plaintiff's estate brought a products-
liability wrongful-death claim in Texas state court against Kimberly-Clark
for its role in manufacturing Kotex tampons, which allegedly caused the
toxic-shock syndrome that led to the plaintiff's death. Kimberly-Clark
filed a third-party claim in Texas state court against PHC-Minden, LP
("MMC"), a Louisiana limited partnership and a subsidiary of Province
Healthcare Company ("Province") for violation of the duty of care to its
patient, the plaintiff. MMC responded with a motion for special appear-
ance, claiming lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court denied the
special appearance without filing findings of fact or conclusions of law.
On interlocutory appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals in Tyler upheld the
denial because MMC's parent corporation, Province, operated hospitals
in Texas. The court concluded that Province's Texas operations could be
imputed to MMC under the single business enterprise theory of piercing
the corporate veil.22
To reach this conclusion, the court examined a series of factors, includ-
ing: "(1) common employees, (2) common offices, (3) centralized ac-
counting, (4) payment of wages by one corporation to another
corporation's employees, (5) common business name, (6) services ren-
dered by the employees of one corporation on behalf of another corpora-
tion, (7) undocumented transfers of funds between corporations, and (8)
unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations. '2 3 But
without clear guidance and out of the magic box of judicial discretion and
"equity," the court found that MMC and its parent corporation, Province,
functioned as a single business enterprise:
In summary, the record shows that Province and MMC have at least
one common employee and that Province pays certain MMC em-
ployees, although the salaries are intercompany payables. The
names of the two companies are similar, and Province employees
provide various services to assist MMC in its operations. Province
exercises control over MMC's revenues and expenditures and over-
sees MMC's operations, financial performance, and completion of
strategic initiatives. Further, Province audits MMC's financial goals
to determine if MMC will be able to meet these goals. Considering
the totality of this evidence, we conclude that Province and MMC
have integrated their resources to achieve a common business
purpose.24
serving that "the single business enterprise theory's multi-factor, non-exclusive test leaves
defendants without guidelines to structure their behavior in a way to avoid the imposition
of liability").
21. No. 12-04-00259-CV, 2005 WL 1979102 (Tex. App.-Tyler Aug. 17, 2005, pet.
filed).
22. Id. at *1-4.
23. Id. at *4.
24. Id. at *6.
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The PHC-Minden decision implies that all that is required to pierce the
corporate veil is a discussion of multiple factors, the choice of which is
seemingly at the court's discretion. Furthermore, the factors that the
court discussed are common to most parent-subsidiary relationships and
do not suggest any wrongdoing. Indeed, no allegation of wrongful use of
the limited liability form was attributed to either entity. Rather, the
court's characterization simply suggests an efficient business structure. A
message easily taken from this decision is that, under Texas common law,
little or no actual certainty exists for the ability of the corporate form to
shield a shareholder from liability.2
5
B. THE INAPPROPRIATE USE OF "SINGLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE"
IN CONTRACT RELATED CASES IN WHICH
ARTICLE 2.21 CONTROLS
As stated repeatedly in previous Surveys, the recent use of common-
law veil-piercing theories to impose liability on shareholders or parent
companies often occurs in clear contravention of the obvious intent of
Article 2.21 of the TBCA.26 One case decided during this Survey period
and another case pending appeal demonstrate a clear need and opportu-
nity for the Texas Supreme Court to unambiguously extinguish the inap-
propriate application of common-law veil-piercing theories27 to Texas
cases covered under Article 2.21.28
Claims arising out of commercial interactions (i.e., contract-related
claims) often take the form of tort claims relating to the process of form-
ing the agreement (i.e., negligent misrepresentation or fraud). 29 Indeed,
"many of the same operative facts that can give rise to a cause of action
for breach-of-contract may also give rise to causes of action for business
25. Another case decided during the Survey period presents an interesting question as
to which state's laws apply to "veil-piercing" issues. In DDH Aviation. L.L.C., 2005 WL
770595, at *6, the court held that "Texas law applies to determine whether [a Texas limited
liability entity's] form should be disregarded, while Delaware law applies to determine
whether [a Delaware corporation's] corporate form should be disregarded." The authors
are not persuaded that other courts follow this formulation. Nor are the authors convinced
that a veil-piercing claim will necessarily be viewed as an "internal affair" as to which the
courts will automatically defer to the law of the state of incorporation. For a recent discus-
sion of the breath of the "internal affairs doctrine," see generally VantagePoint Venture
Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005), as reviewed in Preservation of
Delaware's Internal Affairs Doctrine, EDWARDS ANGELL PALMER & DODGE LLP CoRPo-
RATE LAW AND LITIGATION BULLETIN (2005) (on file with the authors).
26. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon Supp. 2005). See West & Treadway,
supra note 10, at 816 ("The continued failure of the Texas courts to recognize and apply
Article 2.21 is disturbing."); Glenn D. West, supra note 8, at 1227 (quoting TEX. Bus.
CORP. Ac-r ANN. art. 2.21(B) (Vernon Supp. 2001) and noting that, when applicable, Arti-
cle 2.21 precludes common-law liability like that imposed by the single business enterprise
theory).
27. The single business enterprise theory, in particular.
28. I.e., contract claims and claims based on "any matter relating to or arising from the
[contractual] obligation." TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr Arm. art. 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2005).
29. See Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 791 (Tex. 2005)




torts."'30 While pure tort claims unrelated to the creation or breach of a
corporate contractual obligation are clearly free from the requirements of
Article 2.21, tort claims arising from or related to corporate contractual
obligations are unambiguously subject to Article 2.21. 3 1 Article 2.21 re-
quires that:
[A] holder of shares, .. . or any affiliate thereof or of the corporation
shall be under no obligation to the corporation or to its obligees with
respect to. . .any contractual obligation of the corporation or any
matter relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that the
holder .... or affiliate is or was the alter-ego of the corporation, or
on the basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetu-
ate a fraud, or similar theory, unless the obligee demonstrates that
the holder .... or affiliate caused the corporation to be used for the
purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the
obligee for the direct personal benefit of the holder, .... or affiliate.32
Under Article 2.21, the only means by which a parent corporation or a
corporate shareholder may be liable for the obligations of a subsidiary or
affiliate based on "alter-ego," "actual fraud," "constructive fraud," "sham
to perpetuate a fraud," or some other "similar theory" (i.e., single busi-
ness enterprise) is through a demonstration "that the holder . . . or affili-
ate caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and
did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for [its] direct per-
sonal benefit."' 33 Because the single business enterprise theory does not
require any such showing of actual fraud for the direct personal benefit of
the person or entity upon whom liability is sought to be imposed, Article
2.21 essentially removes the availability of that theory in any claim in-
volving contractual obligations or their creation.
Article 2.21 explicitly takes an extra step toward protecting parent cor-
porations, shareholders, or affiliates from liability for contractual obliga-
tions and other matters related to or arising therefrom, specifically stating
that:
[T]he liability of a holder, owner, or subscriber of shares of a corpo-
ration or any affiliate thereof or of the corporation for an obligation
that is limited by Section A of this Article is exclusive and preempts
any other liability imposed on a holder, owner, or subscriber of
shares of a corporation ... under common-law or otherwise. ' 34
The Texas Supreme Court, in Southern Union Co. v. Edinberg,35 reaf-
30. Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 111 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, pet.
denied).
31. See West, supra note 8, at 1227; West & Treadway, supra note 10, at 815-16; West &
Chao, supra note 4, at 1407-08; West & Nelson, supra note 7, at 804-09. See also West &
Stasny supra note 7, at 727 (suggesting time specific language to use to incorporate Article
2.21 into a contract).
32. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003) (emphasis added).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Id. art. 2.21(B) (emphasis added). "Single business enterprise" is, if extant, a com-
mon-law theory of liability.
35. 129 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2003). See West & Nelson, supra note 7, at 808-09.
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firmed Article 2.21 as the "exclusive" means of imposing liability on a
parent, shareholder, or affiliate for corporate contractual obligations.36
The court declined to validate the "single business enterprise" theory,
noting instead that:
We need not decide today whether a theory of "single business en-
terprise" is a necessary addition to Texas law regarding the theory of
alter-ego for disregarding corporate structure and the theories of
joint venture, joint enterprise, or partnership for imposing joint and
several liability. That is because whatever label might be given to the
City's attempt to treat the Valero entities as a single entity, [A]rticle
2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act controls, and the ques-
tions submitted to the jury were intended to embody the require-
ments of [A]rticle 2.21. 37
While unequivocally establishing that Article 2.21 is the exclusive
means of imposing liability on parent corporations, shareholders, and af-
filiates for another corporation's contractual obligations, the Texas Su-
preme Court did not address the additional statutory language making
Article 2.21 the exclusive means of imposing liability on parent corpora-
tions, shareholders, or affiliates for "any matter relating to or arising
from" a corporation's contractual obligation. We have consistently ar-
gued in past Surveys that the phrase "any matter relating to or arising
from" a corporation's contractual obligations in Article 2.21 clearly cov-
ers tort claims that arise from or relate to an underlying contract. Specifi-
cally, we argued that "fraud, fraudulent inducement and negligent
misrepresentation, when committed... in connection with a contractual
obligation being entered into by a corporation ... are all 'matter[s] relat-
ing to or arising from the obligation' as specifically contemplated by Arti-
cle 2.21." 38 A number of Texas cases support this reading of Article
2.21.39
One case decided during this Survey period, De La Hoya v. Coldwell
Banker Mexico, Inc.,40 ignored the clear precedent of the Texas Supreme
36. S. Union Co., 129 S.W.3d at 84.
37. Id. (internal citations omitted).
38. West & Chao, supra note 4, at 1408.
39. See In re J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co., 87 S.W.3d 546, 551 (Tex. 2002) (hold-
ing that whether a contract was fraudulently induced is a matter "involving[,] ... arising
under or related to" the contract) (internal quotation marks removed); Haase v. Glazner,
62 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2001) ("Fraudulent inducement ... is a particular species of fraud
that arises only in the context of a contract and requires the existence of a contact as part
of its proof."); Menetti v. Chavers, 974 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no
pet.) (finding that claims of fraud and negligence, along with claims of breach-of-contract,
all "relate to or arise from a contractual obligation and therefore fall under the amended
article 2.21."); Pabich v. Kellar, 71 S.W.3d 500, 508 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.)
(holding that a tortious interference claim arising from a settlement agreement was subject
to Article 2.21); El Polio Loco, S.A. de C.V. v. El Polio Loco, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 986,
988-89 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that tort claims were connected to the performance of the
agreement so that a choice of law clause requiring "[aIll disputes which may arise in con-
nection with the performance of this Agreement" applied). See also West & Chao, supra
note 4, at 1408 n.99 (citing cases that give an expansive reading of the terms "relating to or
arising from").
40. 125 F. App'x 533 (5th Cir. 2005).
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Court in Southern Union Co. and the plain language of Article 2.21, even
while citing to the statute and the case. De La Hoya involved a series of
real-estate transactions carried out in Mexico between 1999 and 2001.
Plaintiffs claimed misappropriation of their escrow funds by Coldwell
Banker LuLu Jacobsen and Associates (the "Cabo franchise"), a fran-
chisee of Coldwell Banker Affiliates de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. ("CBAM").
Plaintiffs filed their original action in Texas state court, asserting, among
other causes of action, breach-of-contract and negligence against a num-
ber of defendants, including CBAM, its parent corporation, Coldwell
Banker Mexico, Inc. ("CBMI"), and its ultimate owner, Richard A. Smith
("Smith"). 41 The defendants removed the case to federal court based on
diversity, claiming that several of the defendants had been improperly
joined to defeat diversity. The district court agreed and dismissed several
defendants, including CBMI and Smith. The plaintiffs then appealed. 42
The primary issue on appeal was whether CBMI and Smith had been
improperly joined in the suit. According to the court, joinder of CBMI
and Smith was only improper if there was no "reasonable basis on which
the district court [could] predict that plaintiffs might be able to recover
against [CBMI and Smith]."' 43 The plaintiffs' claim against CBAM was
premised on the fact that the agreement creating the Cabo franchise spe-
cifically gave CBAM "the right to inspect, review and audit all franchise
financial records, including those related to ancillary services."' 44 Despite
this power and the knowledge that the Cabo franchise had misappropri-
ated escrow funds in the past, the plaintiffs alleged that CBAM "fail[ed]
to control the Cabo franchise's escrow activities" under the franchise
agreement. 45 The plaintiffs' only claim against CBMI and Smith, how-
ever, was "that CBMI and Smith are liable for CBAM's failure to act
under the 'single business enterprise theory."' Therefore, the viability of
the "plaintiffs' claims against [CBMI and Smith] depend[ed] on the via-
bility of their claims of single business enterprise and CBAM's
liability. "46
As to CBAM's liability, the court noted that "[i]n Texas, where a party
has a right to control the activities of another (created either contractu-
ally or through actual exercise of control), that party has a concomitant
duty to exercise that control reasonably. '47 The court found "that a right
of control arguably arose from the franchise agreement, CBAM's exer-
cise of control, or a combination of the two, and CBAM's knowledge and
failure to timely act on that knowledge arguably breached that duty."'48
41. Id. at 534-35. Smith served as President of both CBMI and CBAM and was 100%
owner of CBMI and 1% owner of CBAM. Id. at 534.
42. Id. at 535.
43. Id. at 536 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2005) and Smallwood v. 111. Cent. R.R., 385
F.3d 568, 572-73 (5th Cir. 2004)).
44. Id. at 535.
45. Id. at 536.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 540.
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To determine CBMI's liability, however, the court simply reviewed and
considered yet another version of the oft-quoted "list of non-exhaustive
factors" test for a finding of single business enterprise, including: "(1)
common employees; (2) common offices; (3) centralized accounting; (4)
payment of wages by one corporation to the other's employees; (5) com-
mon business name; (6) services rendered by the employees of one corpo-
ration on behalf of the other; (7) undocumented transfers of funds
between corporations; (8) unclear allocations of profits and losses be-
tween corporations; and (9) common ownership. ' 49 The court further ex-
plained that "[e]vidence of less than all of these factors can sustain a
finding of single business enterprise. ' 50 Similar to PHC-Minden, the
court had little trouble finding "several single business enterprise factors
... sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for recovery against CBMI
and Smith under that theory."'51
Nevertheless, CBMI and Smith argued that the single business enter-
prise theory was inapplicable under the Texas Supreme Court's holding in
Southern Union Co., which specifically applied Article 2.21 to claims of
single business enterprise. The Fifth Circuit, however, distinguished
Southern Union Co., suggesting that its holding only refused to apply the
single business enterprise theory to impose "the contracts of one corpora-
tion to an affiliated corporation .. .because [A]rticle 2.21 requires a
showing of actual fraud and the single business enterprise theory does
not."'52 According to the Fifth Circuit, unlike the plaintiff in Southern
Union Co., the plaintiffs in De La Hoya were not seeking recovery based
on CBAM's contractual obligations but "based on CBAM's alleged negli-
gence. ' '53 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit sustained the plaintiffs' joinder
of CBMI and Smith and defeated diversity.54
While correctly noting that Article 2.21 covers "contractual obliga-
tions," the court seemingly ignored that it also covers "any matter relat-
ing to or arising from" contractual obligations.55 The negligence claim in
De La Hoya directly arose out of the contractual right of control that
CBAM was granted as a result of the creation of the Cabo franchise that
49. Id. at 538 (citing Bridgestone Corp. v. Lopez, 131 S.W.3d 670, 681-82 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2004, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.)). The Fifth Circuit allowed the
single business enterprise argument on appeal, even though it was not raised in the lower
court because the "allegations of joint enterprise and alter-ego suffice to also claim single
business enterprise liability." Id. at 537 (citing Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. v. City of
Edinburg, 59 S.W.3d 199, 208-10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. granted), rev'd on
other grounds, 129 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2003)). The unpredictability of the single business en-
terprise theory is further evidenced by the disparate pleading requirements in various
courts. Compare De La Hoya, 125 F. App'x at 536-38, with Coleman v. Kl6ckner & Co.
AG, 180 S.W.3d 577, 586-87 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.); Glas v.
Adame, 178 S.W.3d 307, 307-14 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
50. De La Hoya, 125 F. App'x at 538 (citing Nat'l Plan Adm'rs, Inc. v. Nat'l Health
Ins. Co., 150 S.W.3d 718, 745-47 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. granted)).
51. Id. at 539-40.
52. Id. at 538.
53. Id. at 539.
54. Id.
55. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003).
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it allegedly failed to exercise or actually exercised without reasonable
care. The franchise agreement is the defining connection between the
Cabo franchise and CBAM, which were otherwise owned independently.
It is difficult to imagine what the legislature meant by a matter "relating
to or arising from" a contractual obligation if it did not encompass a neg-
ligence claim based either on the right of control found in an agreement
or the exercise of actual control arising from the relationship created
under that agreement. Clearly, all of the claims against CBAM related to
or arose from the existence of the franchise agreement between the Cabo
franchise and CBAM. As a result, any attempt to hold CBMI or Smith
liable for such contract-related tort claims should have been under Arti-
cle 2.21 and not under common-law veil-piercing theories (including the
single business enterprise theory). 56 While the Fifth Circuit was admit-
tedly determining whether CBMI and Smith had been improperly joined
under the very low threshold of "any reasonable basis," the court should
have required allegations and evidence that CBMI and Smith "caused
[CBAM] to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an
actual fraud ... for [CBMI's and Smith's] direct personal benefit. ' 57 The
wrongly-evoked single business enterprise theory required no such show-
ing, and none was offered. Article 2.21 clearly should have been applied
and, in the authors' view, this case, and any case failing to apply Article
2.21 in similar circumstances, is wrongly decided.58
III. LAPSE OF THE CORPORATE FORM AS EXTINGUISHING
CORPORATE CLAIMS
The statutory existence of the corporation, as an entity separate from
the persons who own, control, and operate it, functions both to protect its
shareholders from personal liability and, in some cases, to prevent those
same shareholders from attaining the benefits of property and claims be-
longing to the corporation. 59 While the Texas courts easily disregard the
corporate form when it is used as a shield to protect shareholders from
56. West & Chao, supra note 4, at 1408.
57. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003).
58. A similar case is Nat'l Plan Adm'rs, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Ins. Co., 150 S.W.3d 718
(Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. granted), decided toward the end of the previous Survey
period and currently on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. National Plan Administrators
involved a tort claim arising entirely out of a series of contractual agreements. Id. at 729.
The case appears to have been primarily decided on a procedural issue-failure to specifi-
cally object to the jury charge on the basis that Article 2.21 controlled. Id. at 744. The
decision is nonetheless troubling because it recognizes the single business enterprise theory
as a valid theory (indeed, De La Hoya cites this case as support for the theory, 125 F.
App'x at 538) and because readers will easily miss the nuance that this was a procedural
decision. National Plan Administrators presents a timely opportunity for the Texas Su-
preme Court to put a bullet in this theory and to perhaps clarify the scope of Article 2.21 to
the extent that the procedural-waiver issues can be overcome.
59. See Brock v. Baskin-Robbins USA Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1092 (E.D. Tex.
2000) (holding that the corporation itself, not corporate shareholders, is the only "person"
able to seek recovery for harms done to the corporation); Wingate v. Hajdik, 795 S.W.2d
717, 719 (Tex. 1990) ("A corporate stockholder cannot recover damages personally for a
wrong done solely to the corporation, even though he may be injured by that wrong.").
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liability for the acts of the corporation, the courts are not so willing to
disregard the corporate form when the shield is being used by defendants
from whom the putative corporation is seeking payment. As a creature
of statute, the corporation's continued existence requires adherence to
the statutes that give it life.60 Failure to statutorily maintain the corpo-
rate form may have serious repercussions, including the extinguishment
of claims that the corporation could have brought during its existence. 61
We have discussed in previous Surveys the process by which corporate
privileges may be statutorily revoked. 62 If the corporate charter is for-
feited for failure to comply with the Tax Code, 63 the entity becomes a
"dissolved corporation. '64 Unlike a delinquent corporation,65 whose
right to sue or defend in a court of law is suspended, a dissolved corpora-
tion has three years from the date of dissolution during which it may sue
or be sued.66 Thus, if the dissolved corporation files a bankruptcy peti-
tion during the three-year period, the debtor is allowed to "sue and de-
fend in Texas courts for the purpose of liquidating and distributing its
60. The lapse of the corporate form as affecting rights and liabilities has been ad-
dressed in several previous Surveys. See, e.g., Glenn D. West & Christopher M. Fairman,
Corporations, 53 SMU L. REV. 773, 775 (2000) (discussing "whether a suit brought against
a corporation could be maintained if the corporation had dissolved thirty years earlier");
West, supra note 8, at 1222-25 (discussing the interaction between the "forfeiture of [a]
corporation's charter by the Secretary of State under the Texas Tax Code and... the Texas
three-year survival statute applicable to 'dissolved corporations' pursuant to the Texas
Business Corporation Act").
61. This is often the result of the failure to meet relevant tax and registration require-
ments for a corporation's continued existence, and may result in individual liability for the
corporation's directors or officers. See West, supra note 8, at 1223 (identifying and discuss-
ing potential penalties and liability under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp.
2005)).
62. West, supra note 8, at 1222-25. See also First Trust Corp. v. Edwards, 172 S.W.3d
230, 241 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied); In re ABZ Ins. Servs., Inc., 245 B.R. 255,
257-60 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). The initial process of forfeiture of corporate privileges is
as follows:
A corporation that fails to file a franchise tax report or to pay its assessed
franchise taxes is subject to having the Comptroller forfeit the corporation's
privileges. Forfeiture of corporate privileges results in the corporation being
denied the right to sue or defend in a court of this state and each corporate
director or officer being held liable for the debts of the corporation as pro-
vided in section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code.
Following the forfeiture of its corporate privileges by the Comptroller, the
Secretary of State may then actually forfeit the corporation's charter. The
forfeiture of a corporation's charter causes such corporation to be a "dis-
solved corporation" pursuant to the Texas Business Corporation Act.
West, supra note 8, at 1223 (internal citations omitted). The possible extent of officer lia-
bility under section 171.255 of the Tax Code was also a topic of previous discussion. See
West & Chao, supra note 4, at 1399-1401.
63. A corporation's charter may be forfeited for other reasons listed in TEX. Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. art. 7.12(F)(1) (Vernon 2005).
64. Id. art. 7.12(F)(1)(e).
65. A delinquent corporation is a corporation whose corporate privileges, but not cor-
porate charter, have been forfeited by the Comptroller for failure to file its franchise tax
report or pay its franchise taxes. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
66. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 7.12 (A)(1) (Vernon 2003).
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assets as a 'dissolved corporation.' ' 67 Furthermore, any claims by or
against the corporation before dissolution are preserved during the three-
year survival period.68 During this Survey period, there were two cases in
which the failure of an entity to maintain legal status as a corporation and
the failure to bring claims within the three-year window resulted in the
extinguishment of previously available claims.
In re American Heartland Sagebrush Securities Investments, Inc.69 in-
volved the disputed debtor status of a dissolved corporation seeking to
recover preference payments through a bankruptcy proceeding. The
debtor, Sagebrush Securities & Financial Services, Inc., was a Texas cor-
poration formed on May 26, 1987. On August 8, 1995, the Secretary of
State of Texas officially forfeited Sagebrush's corporate charter for failure
to file a franchise tax report. Although Sagebrush filed tax returns for
2001-2004, the entity remained a dissolved corporation. 70
An SEC investigation into Sagebrush and its alleged affiliated entities
revealed that all entities involved were "mere d/b/a's created and con-
trolled by [Philip D.] Phillips, [founder/majority owner of Sagebrush],
who fraudulently depict[ed] them as registered broker-dealers."'71 A
Chapter 11 proceeding was filed on June 21, 2005, nearly ten years after
the date of dissolution. Citing In re ABZ Insurance Services, Inc. ,72 the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas held
that "if the three year period expires before filing bankruptcy, the pur-
ported corporate debtor ceases to be a person within the meaning of sec-
tion 109 of the Bankruptcy Code eligible to file bankruptcy. ' 73 Since the
three-year window between dissolving the corporation and bringing the
claims as a debtor in bankruptcy had lapsed, Sagebrush was found not to
be an eligible debtor and thus unable to seek the return of improperly
made payments. 74
Emmett Properties, Inc. v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. 75 involved
the contested liability of multiple parties in the contamination of certain
real estate. Emmett Properties, Inc. and Trend, L.P. both owned real
property in close proximity to property owned by Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc. Emmett became a dissolved corporation on February 12,
1999. On June 13, 2002-three years and four months after Emmett's
status as a dissolved corporation commenced-Emmett and Trend both
filed suit, asserting numerous claims against Halliburton and its predeces-
67. West, supra note 8, at 1224. The right of a dissolved corporation to sue and defend
in the bankruptcy context likely includes "any attendant adversary proceedings necessary
to (i) collect its assets, (ii) pay or satisfy its debts and (iii) liquidate its business." Id.
68. TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-r ANN. art. 7.12(A)(2).
69. 334 B.R. 848 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005).
70. Id. at 851.
71. Id. at 850 (citing the SEC's complaint in the pending case of SEC v. Phillips, No. 2-
05CV-107-J (N.D. Tex.)).
72. 245 B.R. 255 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000). See West, supra note 8, at 1222-25.
73. In re Am. Heartland, 334 B.R. at 853 (citing In re ABZ Ins. Servs., 245 B.R. at 260).
74. Id.
75. 167 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
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sors in interest. 76
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss/motion for partial summary judg-
ment to dismiss all of Emmett's claims based on its status as a dissolved
corporation. On September 30, 2003, a hearing was held on defendants'
motion, and all of Emmett's claims were dismissed. The same day as the
hearing, Emmett's corporate charter and privileges were reinstated after
it paid its delinquent franchise taxes. On appeal, Emmett argued that,
although its claims were extinguished after the three-year window ex-
pired, its claims were revived following reinstatement of its charter and
privileges. 77 The Texas Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District in
Houston disagreed: "[t]he Tax Code does not state a corporation's extin-
guished claims are revived."'78
In re American Heartland and Emmett Properties offer a stern lesson.
If not cured within three years, an involuntary dissolution and subsequent
lapse in the corporate form will result in the extinguishment of any claims
that the corporation could have brought before dissolution.79
IV. DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS-AVOIDING
FRAUD CLAIMS THROUGH THE EFFECTIVE
USE OF NONRELIANCE CLAUSES
During this Survey period, the Texas courts continued to reinforce their
long-standing commitment to holding parties to the express terms of their
written contracts. Texas courts specifically enforced forum-selection, ar-
bitration, and damage-limitation clauses, despite claims in a number of
these cases for unconscionablity, mutual mistake, and misunderstand-
ing.80 Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court reiterated that "[a]bsent fraud,
misrepresentation or deceit, a party is bound by the terms of the contract
he signed, regardless of whether he read it or thought it had different
terms."81
In last year's Survey, we noted that it is possible, in a carefully crafted
agreement between sophisticated parties, to defeat any later extra-con-
tractual claim of "fraud, misrepresentation or deceit" that might other-
wise deprive a party of the benefit of the bargained-for contractual
limitations on remedies and representations provided in the written
agreement. 82 While we provided a number of specific drafting sugges-
tions to avoid extra-contractual claims in last year's Survey, we noted that
the suggested clauses were in addition to and not in lieu of the "standard
76. Id. at 367-69.
77. Id. at 367-70.
78. Id. at 370.
79. Id.; In re Am. Heartland, 334 B.R. at 853.
80. In re AdvancePCS Health L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. 2005); Phoenix Network
Techs. (Eur.) Ltd. v. Neon Sys., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,
no pet. h.); In re Big 8 Food Stores, Ltd., 166 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.
h.); Head v. U.S. Inspect DFW, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 731, 748 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no
pet. h.).
81. In re McKinney, 167 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. 2005).
82. West & Stasny, supra note 7, at 722-23.
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disclaimer of reliance on extra-contractual representations" clause. 83 In
view of the large number of cases decided during this Survey period ad-
dressing the validity of nonreliance clauses, we will specifically provide
drafting guidance on disclaimer-of-reliance clauses this year.
As noted in our discussion of Article 2.21 in Part II, disputes involving
business contracts in Texas often involve not only claims for breach-of-
contract, but also tort claims for negligent misrepresentation and fraud.84
In general, tort claims may not be sustained if they are based solely upon
the breach of duties imposed by the contract or seek a remedy based only
on the benefit of the bargain made in the contract.85 An exception to this
rule arises, however, when a party to a contract fraudulently induces an-
other party to enter into that contract, because the duty not to induce
"another to enter into a contract through the use of fraudulent misrepre-
sentations ... is separate and independent from the duties established by
the contract itself."'86 The Texas Supreme Court has held that "tort dam-
ages are recoverable for a fraudulent inducement claim irrespective of
whether the fraudulent representations are later subsumed in a contract
or whether the plaintiff only suffers an economic loss related to the sub-
ject matter of the contract. '87
Once a breach-of-contract claim relating to a corporate obligation is
converted into or coupled with a tort claim, the plaintiff can recover po-
tential exemplary damages not only from the corporate obligor, but also
from the corporate obligor's officers, whom were involved in the negotia-
tion of the related contract. While "Texas law generally imposes liability
on corporations, not individual employees or officers of those corpora-
tions,"88 Texas courts continued to emphasize during this Survey period
that corporate officers, even while acting solely in their capacity as corpo-
rate representatives, can be held personally liable for any tortious con-
duct in which they directly participated on behalf of their corporate
employers. 89 This imposition of individual liability is virtually automatic
83. Id. at 722.
84. See Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 791 (Tex. 2005).
See also supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
85. UMLIC VP LLC v. T&M Sales & Envtl. Sys., Inc., 176 S.W.3d 595, 613-14 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. GE Automation
Servs., Inc., 156 S.W.3d 885, 888 n.5 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.); Wismer
Distrib. Co. v. Brink's Inc., No. Civ.A.H-03-5897, 2005 WL 1840149, at *8-9 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 2, 2005).
86. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41,
46 (Tex. 1998). See also Nazareth Int'l, Inc. v. J.C.Penney Corp., No. Civ.A.3:04-CV-
1265M, 2005 WL 1704793, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2005); Hooker v. Nguyen, No. 14-04-
00238-CV, 2005 WL 2675018, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 20, 2005, no pet.
h.).
87. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 47.
88. Morrow v. Wyeth, No. Civ.A.B-05-209, 2005 WL 2621555, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 13,
2005).
89. Ennis v. Loiseau, 164 S.W.3d 698, 707-08 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet. h.);
Morris v. Kohls-York, 164 S.W.3d 686, 695 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. dism'd); Centu-
rion Planning Corp. v. Seabrook Venture II, 176 S.W.3d 498,509 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.); Glattly v. CMS Viron Corp., 177 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex. App.-
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in any case in which the corporate officer directly and knowingly partici-
pates in a "fraud" or other intentional tort. In negligence cases, however,
it requires a finding that the individual officer had "an independent duty
of reasonable care apart from the employer's duty." 90
In any sophisticated business transaction, there is a substantial ex-
change of information between the parties, both before and during the
contract negotiation; however, the exchanged information is not necessa-
rily intended to be an actual "representation" by one party to the other.91
A "representation" is "a presentation of fact ... made to induce someone
to act."'92 Indeed, many statements made during the negotiation of a bus-
iness transaction are intended to be "merely informational, and ... not
meant by either party to supplant the sophisticated purchaser's own re-
search as the ultimate basis for his purchasing decision. ' 93 Nevertheless,
many of these informational statements become the basis for claims of
fraud and negligent misrepresentation when the terms of the otherwise
fairly bargained-for contract are, in hindsight, deemed to provide insuffi-
cient recourse to the aggrieved party.
A cause of action for fraud based on statements made by another
party, requires only that the plaintiff show:
(1) a material misrepresentation was made, (2) it was false when
made, (3) the speaker knew it was false, or made it recklessly with-
out knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion, (4) the speaker
made it with the intent that it should be acted upon; and (5) the party
acted in reliance and suffered injury as a result.94
The alleged misrepresentation in a fraud action must concern an existing
fact not "a promise to do something in the future" unless "the promise is
made with no intention of performing it at the time it was made. '95 A
claim for fraud may also be based upon the failure to disclose an existing
fact (as opposed to an actual misrepresentation about an existing fact) if
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.). See also Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d
391 (5th Cir. 2005).
90. Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 562-63 (Tex. 2005); Morrow, 2005 WL 2621555, at *4.
While not clear, negligent misrepresentation appears to qualify as a situation in which an
independent duty is presumed to exist. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 415 F.3d at 391. In
past Surveys, we have urged, so far in vain, that the Texas courts should recognize that
Article 2.21 of the TBCA protects corporate officers from both fraud and negligent-mis-
representation claims that arise in the context of the negotiation of a corporate contractual
arrangement. West & Treadway, supra note 10, at 814-15; West & Chao, supra note 4, at
1403-08; West & Nelson, supra note 7, at 804-09.




94. Daldav Assocs., L.P. v. Lebor, 391 F. Supp. 2d 472, 475 (N.D. Tex. 2005). See also
Hubicki v. Festina, 156 S.W.3d 897, 903 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. filed); Recognition
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Am. Auto. Ass'n, 154 S.W.3d 878, 892 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet.
denied); UMLIC VP LLC v. T&M Sales and Envtl. Sys., Inc., 176 S.W.3d 595, 604-05 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied).
95. Daldav Assocs., L.P., 391 F. Supp. 2d at 476. See also Beverick v. Koch Power,
Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145, 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (stating that
"[t]he mere failure to perform a contract is not evidence of fraud").
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the "particular circumstances impose a duty on the party to speak and he
deliberately remains silent." Fraud by nondisclosure requires proof that:
(1) a party conceals or fails to disclose a material fact within the
knowledge of that party; (2) the party knows that the other party is
ignorant of the fact and does not have an equal opportunity to dis-
cover the truth; (3) the party intends to induce the other party to
take some action by concealing or failing to disclose the fact; and (4)
the other party suffers injury as a result of acting without knowledge
of the undisclosed fact.96
Texas courts generally recognize four circumstances in which a duty to
disclose arises:
(1) when there is a fiduciary relationship; (2) when one voluntarily
discloses information, the whole truth must be disclosed; (3) when
one makes a representation, new information must be disclosed
when that new information makes the earlier representation mis-
leading or untrue; and (4) when one makes a partial disclosure and
conveys a false impression.97
A duty to disclose can also arise, however, "if the seller fails to disclose
material facts which would not have been discoverable by a purchaser
exercising ordinary care and diligence, or which could not have been un-
covered by reasonable investigation and inquiry."'98
A claim for negligent misrepresentation is substantially similar to a
traditional claim for fraud, except that the plaintiff is not required to
show that the misrepresentation was made "knowingly or recklessly." 99
To sustain a claim of negligent misrepresentation a plaintiff must instead
prove that:
(1) the defendant, in the course of his business, profession, or em-
ployment, or in another transaction in which he had a pecuniary in-
terest, supplied to the plaintiff false information for guidance in a
business transaction, (2) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information,
(3) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the information, and (4) the de-
fendant's negligent misrepresentation proximately caused the plain-
tiff to suffer the pecuniary loss.1°°
96. Cronus Offshore, Inc. v. Kerr McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 848, 858
(E.D. Tex. 2004).
97. Id.
98. Id. See also Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc. v. Blind Maker, Inc., 184 S.W.3d
840, 876 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet filed). According to a Texas court applying New
York law, the elements of fraudulent concealment and the circumstances giving rise to a
duty of disclosure appear to be substantially the same in New York and Texas. See Green-
berg Traurig of N.Y., P.C. v. Moody, 161 S.W.3d 56, 77-79 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.). See also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d
566, 582 (2d Cir. 2005).
99. In re Med. Wind Down Holdings III, Inc., 332 B.R. 98, 102 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).
100. BCY Water Supply Corp. v. Residential Inv., Inc., 170 S.W.3d 596, 602 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 2005, pet. filed). See also Daldav Assocs. L.P., 391 F. Supp. 2d at 476; Tex.
Motor Coach, L.C. v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 4:05CV34, 2005 WL 3132482, at *5 (E.D.
Tex. Nov. 22, 2005). Unlike Texas law, there seems to be some confusion in New York law
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Like a traditional claim for fraud, the false information that is the subject
of the negligent misrepresentation must relate to an "existing fact."' 101
Similarly, as with a traditional fraud claim, to sustain a negligent-misrep-
resentation claim, the plaintiff must prove reliance on the defendant's
misrepresentation.10 2
While "fraud in the inducement prevents a contract, including merger
and disclaimers of reliance, from coming into being, ' 10 3 Texas courts have
nevertheless upheld the "power of contracting parties to create contrac-
tual provisions that disclaim reliance on prior representations or
promises."'01 4 While these seemingly conflicting statements10 5 have led
some to presume that it is impossible to eliminate "fraud" claims by con-
tractual disclaimers, 10 6 Texas courts are clear that "[i]f the contract and
circumstances of its formation evince clear and specific intent to disclaim
reliance on prior representations, then the element of reliance in a fraud-
ulent-inducement claim is negated as a matter of law."' 0 7 As noted dur-
ing prior Survey periods, however, a disclaimer-of-reliance clause is not
valid unless it is "an important part of the basis of the bargain, not an
incidental or 'boiler plate' provision, and is entered into by parties of rel-
as to whether a negligent-misrepresentation claim may only be brought if "a special rela-
tionship existed between Plaintiff and Defendant to convey accurate information to Plain-
tiff." Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., No. 00 Civ. 1657(BSJ), 2002 WL 31453789,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2002). In New York, the relationship between the ordinary buyer
and seller is not the "closer degree of trust and reliance" required to create a "special
relationship." Id. But see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 404 F.3d at 584 (stating that a negligent-
misrepresentation claim may be brought not only if there is a "special relationship between
the parties," but also if "there is actual privity of contract between the parties or a relation-
ship so close as to approach that of privity").
101. BCY Water Supply Corp., 170 S.W.3d at 603.
102. Simpson v. Woodbridge Props., L.L.C., 153 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2005, no pet. h.). See also Stein v. Deason, 165 S.W.3d 406, 414 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005,
no pet. h.).
103. Steinberg v. Brennan, No. Civ.A.3:03-CV-0562, 2005 WL 1837961, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
July 29, 2005).
104. Id. See also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd, 896 S.W.2d 156
(Tex. 1995); Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997). See also
West & Nelson, supra note 7, at 814-17; West & Stasny, supra note 7, at 712; West & Chao,
supra note 4, at 1420 n.195-96.
105. Steinberg, 2005 WL 1837961, at *3.
106. Some cases have applied this presumption, but the law is far from uniform be-
tween the states or even within a given state in this area. See Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies:
Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-Contractual Misrepresentations, 33 VAL.
U. L. REV. 485 (1999); Note, Balancing the Buyer's Right to Recover for Precontractual
Misstatements and the Seller's Ability to Disclaim Express Warranties, 76 MINN. L. REV.
1189 (1992).
107. Steinberg, 2005 WL 1837961, at *3 (citing Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 179). See
also Cole v. Johnson, 157 S.W.3d 856, 860-62 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.);
Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider, 158 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. filed);
Stark v. Benckenstein, 156 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied). Claims
of nondisclosure may similarly be disclaimed. Cronus Offshore, Inc. v. Kerr McGee Oil &
Gas Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 848, 859 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (stating that "[a]lleged nondisclosures
are merely the converse of misrepresentations and are subsumed under any contract lan-
guage disclaiming reliance on affirmative statements").
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atively equal bargaining position." 1°8 These requirements for the exis-
tence of a valid disclaimer clause have led to some confusion in the case
law, particularly in cases involving "as is" clauses and unsophisticated
parties.109
During this Survey period, the Texas courts decided a number of cases
addressing the efficacy of "disclaimer-of-reliance," "merger," and "as is"
clauses to defeat extra-contractual claims of fraud, fraudulent induce-
ment, and negligent misrepresentation. 10 A number of these cases pro-
vide guidance for effective drafting to ensure enforceability of these
clauses in a contract involving sophisticated parties who have determined
to allocate risk under the express terms of their contract.
The first case, Steinberg v. Brennan,'11 involved breach-of-contract and
fraud claims arising from a stock purchase agreement entered into be-
tween Steinberg and Brennan. Under the stock purchase agreement,
Brennan agreed to transfer shares of common stock of the United Ameri-
can Companies, Inc. ("UAC") to Steinberg. Steinberg paid the stipulated
purchase price but did not receive the shares. Steinberg sued Brennan
for breach-of-contract for Brennan's failure to deliver the shares under
the stock purchase agreement. Steinberg also sued Brennan for fraud
alleging "that Steinberg entered into the agreement in reliance upon
Brennan's false representations of UAC's viability. 11 2 The fraud claim
specifically alleged that Brennan "represented to Steinberg that [UAC]
108. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 896 S.W.2d at 162. See also West & Nelson, supra note
7, at 814 n.85; West & Stasny, supra note 7, at 722 n.19.
109. The confusion revolves around the idea that a disclaimer-of-reliance clause may
itself have been the product of fraud. Thus, many cases, particularly those involving "as is"
clauses and unsophisticated parties, contain statements suggesting that the effectiveness of
such a clause is dependant upon "whether there was a knowing misrepresentation or con-
cealment of a known fact." Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc., 158 S.W.3d at 85. See also Ches-
son v. Hall, No. Civ.A. H-01-315, 2005 WL 2045570, at *27 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2005);
Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc. v. Blind Maker, 184 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.-Austin
2006, pet. filed). This would appear to turn the issue on its head by suggesting that you can
disclaim reliance on prior representations or nondisclosures unless you knowingly made a
misrepresentation or concealed a known fact. The Second Circuit has suggested that the
type of fraud that will invalidate a disclaimer-of-reliance clause is "limited ... to situations
in which 'the party against which the disclaimer is asserted is entirely unaware of the exis-
tence of the disclaimer,' such as when it is 'inserted surreptitiously into the final draft of
the contract."' Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Anien Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 577 (2d Cir.
2005). See also MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 217 (3d Cir. 2005).
That explanation, while not stated by the Texas courts, may help explain the result in two
cases decided during this Survey period involving car sales. See Kane v. Nxcess Motorcars,
Inc., No. 01-04-00547-CV, 2005 WL 497484 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2005,
no pet. h.); Padgett's Used Cars & Leasing, Inc. v. Preston, No. 04-04-00579-CV, 2005 WL
2290249 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Sept. 21, 2005, no pet. h.).
110. See, e.g., Cole, 157 S.W.3d at 856; Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc., 158 S.W.3d at 78;
Stark, 156 S.W.3d at 112; Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc., 184 S.W.3d at 854; Chesson,
2005 WL 2045570, at *1; Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, No. 13-05-419-CV, 2005 WL 3435061
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Dec. 15, 2005, no pet.); Tex. Motor Coach, L.C. v. Blue Bird
Body Co., No. 4:05CV34, 2005 WL 3132482 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2005); Simpson v. Wood-
bridge Props., L.L.C., 153 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.); Steinberg, 2005
WL 1837961, at *1.




was a viable, healthy corporation that had just raised $7 million from the
sale of its stock by Jefferies & Company, an investment banking com-
pany." Further, Steinberg submitted a handwritten note faxed to him
four days before entering into the agreement that evidenced these repre-
sentations.113 Steinberg claimed that these representations were false,
"that UAC was in fact in dire straits. 1 14 Brennan moved for summary
judgment on the fraud claim based on Steinberg's inability to "establish
the fifth element of his fraud claim, reliance, because the parties included
an effective disclaimer-of-reliance in the Stock Purchase Agreement."11 5
The district court centered its analysis on the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swanson.n 6 In Schlum-
berger, the court held that parties could contractually agree that they
were not relying on prior representations made during contract formation
as long as the "contract and the circumstances of its formation evince
clear and specific intent to disclaim reliance on prior representations. 1 17
The Schlumberger court "found such clear and specific intent where so-
phisticated parties, represented by competent counsel, included an em-
phatic, particularized disclaimer-of-reliance in a contract that resolved a
dispute over the valuation of an interest in a dissolving joint venture." 118
In applying these principles to the facts in Steinberg, the district court
noted that, while the provisions of the stock purchase agreement "con-
spicuously and straightforwardly rule[d] out reliance on prior representa-
tions,... [t]here is no indication, however, that the relevant sections were
drafted specially for this transaction, and likewise no evidence concerning
the role of counsel or the existence of any prior disputes or negotia-
tions." 19 As a result, the district court was required to determine
"whether under Schlumberger, the structure and language of a contract
may demonstrate a sophisticated party's clear and unequivocal intent to
disclaim reliance on prior representations, when central facts of Schlum-
berger-e.g., assistance of counsel, prior dispute, and tailored drafting are
absent."120 Relying on a number of Fifth Circuit decisions applying
Schlumberger, the district court concluded that "idiosyncratic drafting
and other characteristic facts of Schlumberger are not a prerequisite for a
finding of clear and unequivocal intent under that case."'1 2' Instead,
"such intent may be discerned from the totality of the circumstances, and
in particular from the text and structure of the contract at issue.11 2 2 Ap-
plying that rule to the facts presented in Steinberg, the district court con-
cluded that the stock purchase agreement and the "surrounding facts
113. Id. at *3.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997).
117. Steinberg, 2005 WL 1837961, at *3.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *4.
120. Id.




demonstrate[d] Steinberg's clear and unequivocal intent to rely upon his
own research and assessment rather than Brennan's representations."'
12 3
In so concluding, the district court noted that the stock purchase agree-
ment not only contained "an omnibus merger clause," but also specific
provisions that directly contradicted Steinberg's "alleged reliance on
prior representations.' 24 For instance, the agreement contained a num-
ber of representations from Steinberg concerning his sophistication and
opportunity to verify information concerning the company. Further, the
agreement specifically provided that there were "[n]o representations as
to the Company's business or prospects. ' 125 According to the district
court, the relevant provisions of the stock purchase agreement were "so
straightforward and so central to the agreement that a party of Stein-
berg's professed sophistication would have to be negligent or duplicitous
to sign the agreement without intending to acquiesce to them.' 12 6
In Simpson v. Woodbridge Properties, LLC,127 the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals made shorter work of the extra-contractual claims of fraud and neg-
ligent misrepresentation arising from a real estate purchase agreement.
In the purchase contract, the parties included a "merger" or "entire
agreement" clause stating: "The Parties shall not be bound by any stipula-
tions, representations, agreements or promises, oral or otherwise not
printed or inserted in written form in the Agreement."'1 28 Affirming the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the
appeals court, without the lengthy analysis of the district court in Stein-
berg, held that the forgoing provision "negated the reliance element es-
sential to each of [plaintiff's] causes of action.' 29 Similarly, in Texas
Motor Coach, L. C. v. Blue Bird Body Co.,130 the court found the "merger
clause in the contract to be outcome determinative of whether Texas Mo-
tor [could] withstand Blue Bird's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
tort claims."'1 31 Despite claims of fraudulent inducement, the court con-
123. Id. at *6.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *7.
127. 153 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.). See also Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 584 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that "when a dis-
claimer-of-reliance is as specific as the one before the Danann court, however, it 'destroys
the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint that the agreement was executed in reliance
upon ... contrary oral representations"').
128. Simpson, 153 S.W.3d at 683.
129. Id. at 684.
130. Tex. Motor Coach, L.C. v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 4:05CV34, 2005 WL 3132482
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2005).
131. Id. at *7. The "merger" clause provided as follows:
Entire Agreement: This Contract represents and incorporates the entire un-
derstanding of the parties hereto. There are no representations, induce-
ments, side-agreements or understandings except as specifically set forth in
this Contract. No person is authorized by Blue Bird to make any such addi-
tional representations, inducements, or side-agreements. And terms or con-
ditions stated in any order submitted by dealer or accepted by Blue Bird that
contradict the terms of this Contract shall be null and void. This Contract




The Court finds that the merger clause bars reliance and that the
Plaintiffs cannot recover for fraud or negligent misrepresentation.
The language of the merger clause specifically states that there are
no representations or inducements except as set forth in the contract.
The parties were sophisticated business persons represented by
counsel. If the prior representations were an inducement for enter-
ing into the agreement, Plaintiffs should have so specified. This was
not a form contract with boiler plate language. Summary Judgment
should be granted for the defendant on all claims. 132
The conclusion from these cases is that an explicit and expansive "waiver
of reliance" set forth in a contract between sophisticated parties is gener-
ally enforceable in Texas, such that the parties may rely on the contrac-
tual limitations to their representations and liabilities. While other states
are not as clear,133 the trend appears to be moving away from the idea
that "fraud vitiates every contract" 34 and toward the principles of free-
dom of contract and justifiable expectations of sophisticated parties. 135
As we have seen, "fraud" is not limited to just those situations that in-
volve reprehensible, flagrant and deliberate deceit. This judical move to-
ward freedom of contract is, thus, beneficial for sophisticated contracting
parties intending to predictably define their rights, liabilities, and obliga-
tions by contract rather than open themselves up to a less clear and less
defined body of tort law to which their bargain was deliberately not made
subject.136
A recent case by the Third Circuit applying Delaware law illustrates
this trend and appears to take the freedom-of-contract principle between
sophisticated parties to its furthest reaches. In MBIA Insurance Corp. v.
Royal Indemnity Co.,137 the court upheld the enforceability of provisions
Id.
132. Id. at *8.
133. The laws of other states are conflicting. For example, New York law is similar to
Texas law on the power of contracting parties to disclaim reliance on prior representations.
See Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1959); Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v.
CIS Air Corp., No. 00 Civ.1657(BSJ), 2002 WL 31453789 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2002); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 575-77 (2d Cir. 2005). Delaware
also appears to recognize the power of contracting parties to clearly and explicitly disclaim
reliance on prior representations. In re Med. Wind Down Holdings III, Inc., 332 B.R 98
(Bankr. D. Del. 2005); but see Abry Partners V, LP v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d
1032, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2006) (holding that public policy will not allow contractual limitation
of damages when seller intentionally lies). Massachusetts, on the other hand, prohibits the
contractual waiver of fraud but permits a disclaimer-of-reliance clause to defeat a negli-
gent-misrepresentation claim. See Bates v. Southgate, 31 N.E.2d 551 (Mass. 1941); Sound
Techniques, Inc. v. Hoffman, 737 N.E.2d 920, 924 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). In California, the
law on disclaiming reliance is less explicit; different courts apply divergent standards of
enforceability. See Megan R. Comport, Comment, Enforcing Contractual Waivers of a
Claim for Fraud in the Inducement, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1031 (1997).
134. Bates, 31 N.E.2d at 556. See also Davis, supra note 106, at 485.
135. See Comport, supra note 133, at 1031.
136. See id. See also Davis, supra note 106, at 485 (discussing the various public-policy
reasons in favor of and opposed to upholding waiver-of reliance-clauses).
137. MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2005). See also In re
Med. Wind Down Holdings III, Inc., 332 B.R at 98.
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contractually waiving any defense based on fraud, despite the apparently
conceded fact that the contract (in this case a series of insurance policies)
had been obtained as a result of a "spectacular fraud. ' 138 Since "[t]he
Delaware Supreme Court ha[d] apparently not addressed the standards
for an effective waiver of a defense based on fraud in the inducement,"1 39
the Third Circuit had to determine how the Delaware Supreme Court
would rule on this issue. 140 The closest Delaware precedent was Norton
v. Poplos,14 1 in which the Delaware Supreme Court found that a "stan-
dard integration clause" was not a "reliable indicium of intent to waive a
fraudulent inducement defense. ' 142 According to the Third Circuit,
"[tihe boilerplate nature of the parties agreement weighed heavily in the
Norton Court's calculus." Indeed, the Norton Court stated: "We see no
reason why a court of equity should enforce a standard 'boiler plate' pro-
vision that would permit one who makes a material misrepresentation to
retain the benefit resulting from that misrepresentation at the expense of
an innocent party.1 43 Subsequent Delaware Chancery Court cases have,
in fact, "read Norton as turning on the relative unsophisticated disposi-
tion of the parties" and have upheld anti-reliance clauses where "the pro-
visions were comprehensive and detailed."'144
The Third Circuit then considered the degree of comprehensiveness
and detail in the waiver provisions in the insurance policies at issue.
Royal Indemnity, the issuer of the policies, argued that, to be enforcea-
ble, a waiver clause needed to be both clear and specific. According to
Royal Indemnity, "Delaware courts will refuse to enforce even a clear
waiver of fraud unless it sets forth the particular representations on
which the induced party agreed not to rely.' x45 The Third Circuit dis-
agreed, holding that "[t]he lack of specificity in Royal's waivers does not
make them any less clear. ' 146 According to the Third Circuit:
Given the potential for misrepresentation from each side of the
agreement, the safer route is to leave parties that can protect them-
selves to their own devices, enforcing the agreement they actually
fashion. This rule will make for less prolix disclaimers and reduce
the likelihood that an intended allocation of the risk of fraud will be
frustrated by unintentional omission from a long and tedious list of
representations. ... When sophisticated parties include a broad but
unambiguous anti-reliance clause in their agreement, the Delaware
Supreme Court will likely indulge in the assumption that they said
138. MBIA Ins. Corp., 426 F.3d at 208.
139. Id. at 214.
140. Id.
141. 443 A.2d 1 (Del. 1982).
142. MBIA Ins. Corp., 426 F.3d at 215.
143. Id. (citing Norton, 443 A.2d at 7).
144. In re Med. Wind Down Holdings III, Inc., 332 B.R. 98, 104 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).
("Because Delaware's public policy is intolerant of fraud, the intent to preclude reliance on
extra-contractual statements must emerge clearly from the contract."); Kronenberg v.
Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff'd, 867 A.2d 902 (Del. 2005).
145. MBIA Ins. Corp., 426 F.3d at 215.
146. Id. at 218
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what they meant and meant what they said.147
In light of the clarity with which Texas courts and a number of other
states have stated the standard by which sophisticated parties may relia-
bly waive reliance on extra-contractual tort claims, it is up to the parties
to determine whether they want to make this disclaimer a part of their
deal.148 To avoid any risk that a sample clause written here could become
"boiler plate," we have resisted the urge to provide sample language and
suggest that these clauses be "hammered out by sophisticated parties
aided by consummate legal professionals. '149
Given the differing views of the courts in various states on the issue of
the enforceability of anti-reliance clauses, we again remind practitioners
to be especially vigilant in the wording of choice-of-law clauses. As we
noted in the 2004 Survey, a choice-of-law clause that only applies a partic-
ular state's law to the "construction and interpretation of the agreement"
will not cover tort claims for fraud or misrepresentation arising out of
that contract or its negotiation. 150 Several cases decided during this Sur-
vey period re-emphasized that point.151 We direct our readers to the 2005
Survey for our suggested clause to clearly and effectively encompass both
tort and contract claims in a choice-of-law clause. 152
147. Id.
148. For suggested guidelines in crafting your agreement, see Glenn D. West, Avoiding
Extra-Contractual Fraud Claims in Portfolio Company Sales Transactions-Is "Walk-
Away" Deal Certainly Achievable for the Seller?, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP PRI-
VATE EouiY ALERT (Mar. 2006) (on file with the authors).
149. Id. As a bargaining concession, corporate-acquisition agreements often explicitly
except "fraud" from the exclusive remedy provision that otherwise makes the indemnifica-
tion provisions of the agreement the exclusive remedy for any breach. In an agreement
containing an otherwise enforceable nonreliance clause and an otherwise exclusive set of
remedies with "caps" and "baskets," what does an exception for "fraud" mean? The most
common explanation is that, with respect to the actual representations set forth in the
agreement, as opposed to any extra-contractual representations, fraud eliminates the limi-
tations on the contractual remedies otherwise set forth in the "caps" and "baskets." There
are a number of concerns with this explanation. First, as has been previously discussed in
this Article, fraud is a broad concept that is not limited to flagrant and deliberate deceit.
So, is an exception for fraud a representation that everything that should have been repre-
sented has been represented? Second, fraud constitutes a tort, and this permits punitive
damages as a remedy. In a contract that has otherwise limited a party's remedy for breach
to contractual damages only, does a fraud exception open the door to tort-damage claims,
including possible punitive damages? Third, does a fraud exception present a possible con-
flict with the waiver-of-reliance clause itself, thereby re-opening claims of fraud based on
extra-contractual representations? See Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v. Allegeny Energy, Inc.,
No. 02 Civ. 7689, 2005 WL 832050, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2005) ("express carve-out for
causes of action arising from fraud renders [exclusive remedies provision] meaningless" if
action is based upon fraud.). If the "fraud" exception means that a deliberate and knowing
breach of one of the specific contractual representations expressly set forth in the agree-
ment will not be subject to the "caps" and "baskets" otherwise limiting overall damage
claims, our suggestion is that the agreement say exactly that and not rely on a general
exception as to "fraud." See West & Stasny, supra note 7, at 721-25; West & Nelson, supra
note 7, at 814-17.
150. West & Nelson, supra note 7, at 817.
151. Fairmont Supply Co. v. Hooks Indus., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Tissue Transplant Tech., Ltd. v. Osteotech, Inc., No. Civ. A.
SA-04-CA-0819, 2005 WL 958407 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2005).
152. West & Stasny, supra note 7, at 724.
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